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This research suggests that the evolution of entrepreneurial spirit played a signi￿cant role
in the process of economic development and the dynamics of inequality within and across
societies. The study argues that entrepreneurial spirit evolved non-monotonically in the
course of human history. In early stages of development, the rise in income generated
an evolutionary advantage to entrepreneurial, growth promoting traits and their increased
representation accelerated the pace of technological progress and the process of economic
development. Natural selection therefore had magni￿ed growth promoting activities in
relatively wealthier economies as well as within the upper segments of societies, enlarging
the income gap within as well as across societies. In mature stages of development, however,
non-entrepreneurial individuals gained an evolutionary advantage, diminishing the growth
potential of advanced economies and contributing to the convergence of the intermediate
level economies to the advanced ones.
JEL Classi￿cation: O11, O14, O33, O40, J11, J13.
Keywords: Elasticity of Substitution, Growth, Technological Progress, Evolution, Natural
Selection.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This research examines the reciprocal interplay between the evolution of entrepreneurial spirit
and the process of development. The analysis suggests that the prevalence of entrepreneurial
traits evolved non-monotonically in the course of human history. In the early stages of de-
velopment growth promoting entrepreneurial traits generated an evolutionary advantage and
their increased representation accelerated the pace of technological advancements, contributing
signiﬁcantly to the process of development and the transition from stagnation to growth. As
economies matured, however, this evolutionary pattern was reversed. Entrepreneurial individu-
als had an evolutionary disadvantage, diminishing the growth potential of advanced economies.1
The study argues that historical variations in geographical, environmental and social
factors aﬀected the pace of this evolutionary process and thus the prevalence of growth pro-
moting entrepreneurial traits across economies, contributing to the sustained contemporary
diﬀerences in productivity and income per-capita across countries. Interestingly, the theory
suggests that in early stages of development, the forces of natural selection had magniﬁed
growth promoting activities in relatively wealthier economies, enlarging the gap in income per
capita between societies. However, as the growth process matured in advanced economies, the
forces of natural selection contributed to a convergence of the intermediate level economies to
the advanced ones. It diminished the growth potential of the most advanced economies, and
enhanced the growth process of the intermediate ones. Thus, unlike the commonly underlined
forces for economic convergence (i.e., higher returns to investments in human capital, physical
capital, and technological adoption for the laggard countries), the research proposes that a
higher prevalence of growth promoting entrepreneurial traits in the middle income economies
contributed to economic convergence. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that in the least
advanced economies, selection of growth promoting traits has been delayed, contributing to the
persistence of poverty.
The predictions of the proposed theory provide further understanding of the path of in-
come inequality within a society over time. Consistent with the observed pattern of inequality
in the process of development (Galor, 2005), the study suggests that in early stages of devel-
opment inequality widens due to a more rapid selection of entrepreneurial individuals among
the elites. However as the economy matures, inequality subsides due to the increased represen-
tation of entrepreneurial individuals among the middle and the lower class. In particular, this
prediction is consistent with the class origin of entrepreneurs during the industrial revolution.
1The theory is perfectly applicable for either social or genetic intergenerational transmission of traits. Cultural
transmission is likely to be more rapid. The interaction between cultural and genetic evolution is explored by
Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). A cultural transmission of preferences was
recently explored by Bisin and Verdier (2000).
1The failure of the landed aristocracy to lead the innovative process of industrialization could
be attributed to the low representation of growth promoting entrepreneurial traits within the
landed gentry, and their prevalence of among the middle and even the lower class.
This research develops an evolutionary growth theory that underlines the importance
of the evolution of entrepreneurial spirit in the transition from stagnation to growth. It con-
structs an overlapping-generations economy that due to the forces of natural selection evolves
endogenously from a Malthusian epoch into a state of sustained economicg r o w t h .T h eg r o w t h
process is fueled by technological progress that is aﬀected positively by the level of income per
capita as well as by the prevalence of entrepreneurial individuals in the economy. Variations
in entrepreneurial spirit are modeled as diﬀerences in the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and fertility, reﬂecting how sensitive they are to changes in relative prices and
capturing therefore their responsiveness to arbitrage opportunities. These diﬀerences in the
elasticity of substitution across individuals aﬀect their reproductive success diﬀerentially and
are transmitted across generations, either genetically or culturally. In early stages of devel-
opment, countries that are observed to be in a stationary equilibrium undergo a change in
the (latent) distribution of entrepreneurial spirit. A low degree of entrepreneurial spirit has an
adverse eﬀect on fertility and reproductive success, raising the frequency of the entrepreneurial,
characterized by high elasticity of substitution, growth promoting individuals in the economy
and stimulating the growth process. However, as economies mature, lower elasticity of substi-
tution (i.e., lower level of entrepreneurial spirit) has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on reproductive success,
diminishing the growth potential of the economy. The non-monotonic eﬀect of entrepreneurial
spirit on fertility across diﬀerent levels of income per capita is the driving force behind the
changing distribution of the entrepreneurial individuals in the population along the path of
economic development. It contributes to the non-monotonic eﬀect of natural selection on in-
equality across nations, stimulating divergence in early stages of development and convergence
in more mature phases.
The reversal in the evolutionary advantage of the entrepreneurial types stems from the
eﬀect of the level of income on the relative cost of consumption and child rearing. The higher
is the elasticity of substitution the lower is the curvature of the indiﬀerence curves between
consumption and fertility. As the economy progresses and wage income increases, the oppor-
tunity cost of child rearing increases relative to consumption. Consequently, at suﬃciently low
levels of income the cost of children (whose production is time-intensive) is lower than that of
consumption and individuals with high elasticity of substitution, whose choices are more re-
sponsive to the relative prices, optimally allocate more resources towards child rearing. Hence,
the representation of entrepreneurial trait in the population increases over time in early stages
2of development. As the economy develops and wage income increases, the cost of raising chil-
dren is eventually higher than the cost of consumption. Individuals with higher entrepreneurial
spirit, who are more responsive in their choices to relative prices, optimally allocate more re-
sources towards consumption and less toward children. Thus, entrepreneurial spirit declines
over time in advance stages of development.2
Interestingly, the forces of natural selection are critical for the escape from the Malthu-
sian epoch. In their absence the economy will remain indeﬁnitely in a Malthusian equilibrium.
Namely, if the elasticity of substitution is not hereditary and the distribution of types remains
unchanged over time, the level of income per capita will be stationary at a level where consump-
tion is at the subsistence level and fertility is at replacement level. Technological advancement
will be counterbalanced by an increase in population growth, whereas adverse technological
shocks will be oﬀset by population decline.
The predictions of the theory regarding the reversal in the evolutionary advantage of
entrepreneurial individuals in more advanced stages of development could be examined indi-
rectly based on the eﬀect of risk aversion on fertility choices in contemporary developed and
underdeveloped economies.3 Existing evidence is consistent with the proposed hypothesis sug-
gesting that entrepreneurial propensity, proxied by risk tolerance, is positively correlated with
the number of children in less developed economies and negatively in developed economies.4
Wik et al. (2004), using an experimental gambling method, derive a measure of risk aversion
for agricultural household heads in Northern Zambia. They ﬁnd that larger households are
negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the degree of risk aversion, controlling for sex, age,
income, education, farm area, etc.5 Similarly negative and statistically signiﬁcant association
between the size of the household and the degree of risk aversion is found among rural house-
holds in Indonesia, using a gambling experimental approach (Miyata, 2003). Consistently with
the proposed theory, the opposite correlations are found in developed countries. Finkelman
and Finkelstein (1996) report that family size is positively correlated with risk aversion among
farmers in Israel,6 a n dD o h m e ne ta l .( 2 0 0 5 )u s i n gaG e r m a ns u r v e yd e s i g n e dt oa s s e s st h e
2At the level of income where the cost of children is equal to the cost of consumption, consumption and
fertility choices are identical across diﬀerent types of individuals.
3Empirical studies investigating the relationship between entrepreneurial propensity itself and fertility are
not available.
4Several surveys (e.g., gambling experiments with real or hypothetical payoﬀs) have been conducted in de-
veloping countries measuring attitudes towards risk among individuals in rural areas and relating them to
socioeconomic characteristics. The measure of risk aversion in the reported studies is the partial relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient which relates both to the relative risk aversion and the absolute risk aversion (Bar-Shira et
al., 1997).
5In the absence of direct measure of the number of children, the size of the household is the variable of interest
because it correlates closely with number of children produced by the household. Reassuringly, extended families
do not drive the results.
6In absence of comparable data on income and wealth across groups in these studies, educational diﬀerences
3correlation between the number of children on the degree of risk taking in several realms of
life (e.g., investment and career choices, health, driving, etc.) ﬁnd that lower willingness to
undertake risk is associated with more children.
The theory rests upon two fundamental building blocks: the positive eﬀect on techno-
logical change of the frequency of individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit (e.g., those charac-
terized by high elasticity of substitution, and therefore by a larger degree of responsiveness to
incentives and relative prices), and the heritability of this entrepreneurial spirit.7 The positive
association between the frequency of the entrepreneurial individuals in the population on the
rate of technological growth is well documented in the literature, and is at the foundation of
the Schumpeterian viewpoint (e.g., Schumpeter (1934), Aghion and Howitt (1992)), where the
role of entrepreneurs is instrumental in the process of innovations.8 It is also related to the
Boserupian hypothesis according to which the struggle for survival in the Malthusian epoch
generated the inducement for inventions (Boserup, 1965).
Furthermore, consistent with the supposition that entrepreneurial spirit is heritable,
evidence described in the next section, suggests that the trait of “novelty seeking” has been
subjected to a selection process in the recent past. More generally, evidence suggests that
evolutionary processes in the composition of existing genetic traits may be rather rapid, and
major evolutionary changes have occurred in the human population over the time period that is
the focus of this study.9 Voight et al. (2006) detected about 700 regions of the human genome
where genes appear to have been reshaped by natural selection within the last 5,000 to 15,000
years. Moreover, a recent study by Mekel-Bobrov et al. (2005) reports that a variant of the
gene ASPM (a speciﬁc regulator of brain size in the lineage leading to Homo sapiens) arose
may proxy for economic development. Average education of farmers in the Mexicans sample was about 2.5 years,
in Zambia 5.2 and Indonesia 5.7. In contrast, average education of Israeli farmers was 12 years.
7See Hayek (1948) and Kirzner (1973).
8Audretsch and Thurik (2001/2) investigating the eﬀect of entrepreneurship (proxied by the relative share
of economic activity accounted for by small ﬁrms, and the self-employment rate) among OECD countries ﬁnd
that increases in entrepreneurial activity tends to result in higher subsequent growth rates and a reduction of
unemployment. Such a positive relationship obtains also at a regional level. Audretsch and Keilbach (2005)
examine the eﬀect of the number of startups relative to its population across regions of Germany and document
a large positive impact of entrepreneurship capital on regional labor productivity. These studies lend credence to
the assumption that the magnitude of the frequency of entrepreneurial individuals is a determinant of economic
success both at national and regional level.
9There are numerous examples of rapid evolutionary changes among various species. The color change that
peppered moths underwent during the 19th century is a classic example of evolution in nature (see Kettlewell,
1973). Before the Industrial Revolution light-colored English peppered moths blended with the lichen-covered
bark of trees. By the end of the 19th century a black variant of the moth, ﬁrst recorded in 1848, became far
more prevalent than the lighter varieties in areas in which industrial carbon removed the lichen and changed the
background color. Hence, a signiﬁcant evolutionary change occurred within a time period which corresponds to
only hundreds of generations. Moreover, evidence from Daphne Major in the Galapagos suggests that signiﬁcant
evolutionary changes in the distribution of traits among Darwin’s Finches occurred within few generations due to
a major drought (Grant and Grant, 1989). Other evidence, including the dramatic changes in the color patterns
of guppies within 15 generations due to changes in the population of predators, are surveyed by Endler (1986).
4in humans merely about 5800 years ago and has since swept to high frequency under strong
positive selection. Other notable evidence suggests that lactose tolerance was developed among
European and Near Easterners since the domestication of dairy animals in the course of the
Neolithic revolution, whereas in regions that were exposed to dairy animals in later stages,
a larger proportion of the adult population suﬀers from lactose intolerance. Furthermore,
genetic immunity to malaria provided by the sickle cell trait is prevalent among descendents
of Africans whose engagement in agriculture improved the breeding ground for mosquitoes
and thereby raised the incidence of malaria, whereas this trait is absent among descendents of
nearby populations that have not made the transition to agriculture.10
1.1 Related Literature
The transition from stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great diver-
gence have been the subject of intensive research in the growth literature in recent years.11
GalorWeil99, GalorWeil00, GalorMoav02, Doepke04, Galor05, HansenPrescott02, Lagerlof06,
Lucas02
It has been increasingly recognized that the understanding of the contemporary growth
process would be fragile and incomplete unless growth theory could be based on proper micro-
foundations that would reﬂect the various qualitative aspects of the growth process and their
central driving forces. Moreover, it has become apparent that a comprehensive understanding of
the hurdles faced by less developed economies in reaching a state of sustained economic growth
would be futile unless the factors that prompted the transition of the currently developed
economies into a state of sustained economic growth could be identiﬁed and their implications
would be modiﬁed to account for the diﬀerences in the growth structure of less developed
economies in an interdependent world.
Despite the existence of compelling evidence about the interaction between human evo-
lution and the process of economic development, only few attempts have been made to examine
this reciprocal relationship. This exploration is likely to revolutionize the understanding of the
impact of major economic transitions on human evolution and the eﬀect of the forces of natural
selection, via their impact on the composition of human traits, on the pace of the process of
economic development. A notable exception is a study by Galor and Moav (2002) that explores
the reciprocal interaction between the process of economic development and human evolution.
It suggests that the Neolithic revolution and the subsequent epoch of Malthusian stagnation
triggered a selection of traits of higher valuation for oﬀspring quality, that ultimately played a
10See Livingstone (1958), Wiesenfeld (1967) and Durham (1982).
11See e.g., Galor and Weil (1999), Galor and Weil (2000), Doepke (2004), Galor and Moav (2002), Galor
(2005), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Lagerlöf (2006), and Lucas (2002).
5signiﬁcant role in the transition from stagnation to growth. Lagerlöf (2007) examines the inter-
action between the evolution of body size and the process of development since the emergence
of the Homo sapiens. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) examine the eﬀect of diﬀerences in human
characteristics that are transmitted across generations on the diﬀusion of development across
countries over the very long run. Other studies have abstracted from the reciprocal interaction
between human evolution and the process of development and have focused on the eﬀect of the
economic environment on the evolution of human characteristics. Ofek (2001) and Saint-Paul
(2006) examine the eﬀect of the emergence of markets on the evolution of heterogeneity in the
human population. Galor and Moav (2007) study the eﬀect of the Neolithic Revolution and the
associated rise in population density on the evolution of life expectancy, and Borghans et al.
(2005) explore the eﬀect of human cooperation on the evolution of Major Histocompatibility
Complex (MHC).12
The implications of the theory for the class origin of entrepreneurs during the Industrial
Revolution is complementary to those of Doepke and Zilibotti (2007) and Doepke and Zilibotti
(2005). Their theory suggests that a new class of entrepreneurs rising from the middle classes,
imbued with ethics emphasizing patience and savings, proved most capable of proﬁting from
new economic opportunities, and eventually surpassed the pre-industrial elite. Similarly, we
argue that the failure of the landed aristocracy to lead the innovative process of industrialization
could be attributed to the eﬀect of natural selection on the lower prevalence of entrepreneurial
spirit among the landed gentry, and a higher prevalence among the middle and even the lower
classes. Moreover, the existence of primogeniture in preindustrial Europe limited social and
income mobility between the landed gentry and the other classes (Bertocchi, 2006), allowing the
forces of natural selection to diﬀerentially aﬀect the evolution of entrepreneurial spirit across
classes, leading to the observed variations in the involvement of the upper and the middle class
in the Industrial Revolution13.
12The evolution of preferences, in a given economic environment, has been explored in the economic literature,
as surveyed by Weibull (1995) and Bowles (1998), and is explored more recently by Weibull and Salomonsson
(2006). Welch and Bernardo (2001) establish that overconﬁdent entrepreneurs are evolutionary optimal in an
environment characterized by poor aggregation of information and herding behavior. Overconﬁdent entrepre-
neurs provide a positive information externality to the group they belong to by revealing their own information.
Palacios-Huert and Santos (2004) examine the eﬀect of market incompleteness on the formation of risk aversion,
demonstrating that if the formation of lower risk aversion is costly market completeness and greater risk aversion
are complements.
13The documented higher fertility rates of the countryside over the urban population in medieval Europe
(Livvi-Bacci, 1997) should not prompt to direct comparisons of entrepreneurial spirit between these two groups.
O b v i o u s l y ,t h ee c o n o m i cr o l ea n dt h ec o s to fc h i l dr e a r i n gd i ﬀers across sectors. The important prediction
c o m i n gf r o mt h et h e o r yi st h a tw i t h i ne a c hs e c t o ra sl o n ga sr e l a t i v ep r i c e sa r ei nf a v o ro fc h i l dr e a r i n gt h em o r e
entrepreneurial individuals have the evolutionary advantage.
61.2 Genetic Evidence About the Evolution of Novelty Seeking
This section provides an overview of the psychological and biological literature that links en-
trepreneurial activities to heritable genetic traits, and it interprets the evolutionary patterns
of these traits in light of the proposed theory.
Several models in psychiatry and social psychology have been proposed for classifying
temperament and personality characteristics. Cloninger (1987) propose four genetically homo-
geneous and independent dimensions of personality: novelty seeking, harm avoidance, reward
dependence and persistence that are hypothesized to be based on distinct neurochemical and
genetic substrates. In particular, novelty seeking is closely associated with the notion of en-
trepreneurial spirit in the economics literature. As elaborated by Kose (2003), “Individuals
exhibiting high novelty seeking are enthusiastic, curious, and are quick to engage with what-
ever is new and unfamiliar, which leads to exploration of potential rewards. Furthermore, they
get excited about new ideas and activities easily, for they tend to seek thrills, excitement, and
adventures thus they may be described as unconventional or innovative. On the other hand
individuals characterized by decreased novelty seeking do not derive special satisfaction from
exploration and consequently are contended with or prefer familiar places, people, and situ-
ations. Such individuals are resistant or slow to engage in new ideas and activities and thus
tend to stick with familiar “tried and true” routines even if there are new and better ways to
do the same thing”.
Human personality traits that can be reliably measured by rating scales show a con-
siderable heritable component. One such rating scale is the Tridimensional Personality Ques-
tionnaire (TPQ), which was designed by Cloninger et al. (1996) to measure Harm Avoidance,
Novelty Seeking and Reward Dependence. Several studies have shown that a large component
of the observed variation in the behavioral traits as measured by the TPQ can be attributed to
genetic diﬀerences. For example, genetic analysis of data from 2,680 adult Australian homozy-
gotic and heterozygotic twin pairs demonstrated signiﬁcant genetic contributions to variation in
scores on the Harm Avoidance, Novelty Seeking, and Reward Dependence scales of Cloninger’s
Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire, accounting for between 54% and 61% of the varia-
tion in these traits (C. et al. (1994) and Stallings et al. (1996)). Similar evidence for genetic
heritability of the trait of harm avoidance is provided by Tellegen et al. (1988) who studied per-
sonality similarities in twins reared apart and together and concluded that 55% of the observed
diﬀerences is due to genetic inﬂuences.
Evidence from twin studies strongly suggests that a substantial component of the ob-
served variation in degrees of novelty seeking may be attributed to genetic variation, (Rodgers
et al. (2001) and Kohler et al. (1999)). Furthermore, the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene
7has been studied extensively in the biological literature as a potential candidate for moderating
the novelty seeking behavior. Although the evidence is still inconclusive a positive association
between a certain polymorphism in the DRD4, the 7-repeat allele, and novelty seeking behavior
is most widely documented. The available genetic, biochemical and physiological data suggest
that the 7-repeat allele has been subjected to positive selection. This ﬁnding implies that once
more entrepreneurial individuals were introduced in the human population they started pro-
creating at higher rates throughout most of human history, corroborating the focal prediction
of the theory.
Cloninger et al. (1996) proposed that individual variations in the novelty seeking trait
are mediated by genetic variability in dopamine transmission. Ebstein et al. (1996) tested this
hypothesis in a group of 124 unrelated Israeli subjects and found that higher than average
novelty seeking test scores were positively and signiﬁcantly associated with a particular exonic
polymorphism, the 7-repeat allele at the locus for the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene.
The association of high novelty seeking and the 7-repeat allele was independent of ethnicity,
sex, or age of the subjects.14 However, not all subsequent studies have been able to reproduce
this association. JA et al. (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of the published studies regarding
the relationship between dopamine receptor D4 gene and novelty seeking and found that the
existing evidence is inconclusive for the association between the 7-repeat allele and novelty
seeking behavior, noting however that a small positive eﬀect was found for long repeats of the
same polymorphism (including the 7R allele) and novelty seeking.
As to the genetic evolution of the dopamine receptor D4 locus, Ding et al. (2002) studying
a world wide population sample propose that the 7R allele originated as a rare mutational event
around 40,000 years ago that nevertheless increased to high frequency in human populations
by positive selection. To the extent that the 7-repeat allele is associated with novelty seeking
behavior the ﬁndings of Ding et al. (2002) conﬁrm the basic prediction of our model. Individuals
characterized by high elasticity of substitution at low levels of economic development have the
evolutionary advantage and the introduction of such trait in an environment characterized by
very low income levels (i.e., the emergence of the 7-repeat allele bearers around 40.000 years
ago) should have led to an appreciable increase in their representation in the population.
Finally, complementary evidence suggests that entrepreneurial propensity is indeed hered-
itary. White et al. (2006) examine empirically how entrepreneurial activity is associated with
a heritable biological trait, that of testosterone levels. After collecting testosterone and bio-
graphical data on experienced MBA students with signiﬁcant prior involvement in the creation
of a new venture and other student subjects with no new venture start-up experience, they
14These results were corroborated by Benjamin et al. (1996) who investigated the relationship between DRD4
exon 3 sequence variants and personality test scores.
8ﬁnd that higher testosterone levels are signiﬁcantly associated with prior new venture start-up
experience. Increased testosterone levels increase the probability of entrepreneurial activity
both directly and indirectly via the propensity towards risk. This ﬁnding coupled with studies
from endocrinology (Meikle et al. (1988) and Harris et al. (1998)), which show that production
of testosterone levels is heritable, substantiate the assumption regarding a genetic heritability
of entrepreneurial propensity.15
2 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which economic activity extends over inﬁnite
discrete time. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good using land
and labor as inputs in the production process. The supply of land is exogenous and ﬁxed over
time whereas the supply of labor is determined by the size of the population.
2.1 Production of Final Output
Production occurs according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology that is subject to en-
dogenous technological progress. The output produced at time   is
 =( )1−
 ;  ∈ (01) (1)
where  is the labor employed in period   i st h el a n du s e di np r o d u c t i o ni ne v e r yp e r i o d ,
 is the technological level in period  and  is therefore the “eﬀective resources” used in
production in period 
Suppose that there are no property rights over land.16 T h er e t u r nt ol a n di ne v e r yp e r i o d
is therefore zero, and the wage rate in period  is equal to the output per worker produced at
time  
 =[ ( )] (2)
where () is the level of eﬀective resources per worker at time .
15Nielsen et al. (2005) ﬁnd that within the group of genes that shows the strongest evidence for positive
selection in humans there are also genes that are involved in spermatogenesis that directly inﬂuence testosterone
levels.
16The modeling of the production side is based upon two simplifying assumptions. First, capital is not an
input in the production function, and second the return to land is zero. Alternatively it could have been assumed
that the economy is small and open to a world capital market in which the interest rate is constant. In this
case, the quantity of capital will equalize its marginal product to the interest rate, while the price of land will
follow a path such that the total return on land (rent plus net price appreciation) will be equal to the interest
rate. Allowing for capital accumulation and property rights over land would complicate the model to the point
of intractability, but would not aﬀect the qualitative results.
92.2 Preferences and Constraints
In every period  a generation that consists of  heterogenous individuals joins the labor force.
Each individual has a single parent. Members of generation  (those who join the labor force
in period )l i v ef o rt w op e r i o d s .I nt h eﬁrst period of life (childhood), individuals consume a
fraction of their parental income. In the second period of life (parenthood), every individual
 of generation  is endowed with 1 unit of time, they work and generate an an income 
which they allocate between consumption, 
 and child rearing 
 where  is the fraction
of parental income that is devoted for raising a child, and 
 is the number of children.17
Every generation  consists of individuals that are distinguished by the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and fertility which is transmitted genetically or culturally.
Preferences are transmitted without alteration from generation to generation within a dynasty.
The distribution of types evolves over time due to the eﬀect of natural selection on the relative
size of each dynasty. In a given environment, the type with the evolutionary advantage (i.e., the
type characterized by higher fertility rates) will gradually dominate the population. However,
changes in the economic environment may shift the evolutionary advantage to other types.
Preferences of individual  of generation  are represented by a utility function deﬁned
over consumption, 
 as well as over the number of their children, 
18 and they are subjected
to a subsistence consumption constraint, ˜ 19 In particular, to simplify the exposition it is







; 1,  ∈ (1¯ ) (3)
17The parameter  can be interpreted therefore as the time cost of raising a child.
18For simplicity, the analysis abstracts from child mortality risk. Alternatively one can interpret the preferences
such that parents derive utility from the expected number of surviving oﬀspring and the cost of child rearing is
associated only with surviving children.
19Alternatively, the utility function could have been deﬁned over consumption above subsistence rather than
over a consumption set that is truncated from below by the subsistence consumption constraint. In particular,
if 

 =[ 1 (1 − )]( − ˜ )
(1−) +  the complexity of the dynamical system would be greatly enhanced.
The income expansion path would be smooth, evolving continuously from being nearly vertical for low levels of
potential income to asymptotically horizontal for high levels of potential income. Using such a formulation the
qualitative results regarding the non-monotonic evolution of reproductive success across such dynasties remain
intact.
20As it will become apparent, given the evolution of relative price of consumption with respect to children,
this is a realistic and necessary assumption which implies that the cost of physiologically sustaining an adult, ˜ 
does not exceed the level beyond which relative prices are in favor of consumption. Speciﬁcally, at low stages of
development, when wage income is suﬃciently low (i.e.,   1) the cost of raising a child,  is lower than
the cost of a consumption unit whose price is normalized to 1. It is during this stage that more entrepreneurial
individuals allocate more resources to the relatively cheaper good, i.e. children, and have the evolutionary
advantage. As the economy develops and wage income increases, however, the cost of raising a child increases
proportionally to income, whereas the cost per unit of consumption decreases as a proportion of income. Thus,
at suﬃciently high stages of development (i.e.,   1) the relative price becomes in favor of the consumption
good.
10where  governs the elasticity of substitution21,  ∈ (1¯ ) where ¯  ≡ 1+l n ( )ln˜ 
The higher is  the lower is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and fertility
for individual . The elasticity of substitution is the only source of heterogeneity within a
generation.22 The elasticity of substitution is assumed to be perfectly hereditary, and the
distribution of  changes therefore due to the eﬀect of natural selection on the distribution of
types.
Remark: The qualitative results will not be aﬀected if a broader class of preferences is adopted.
In particular, as established in Section 6, the qualitative results will be maintained if:
(a) The elasticity of substitution is distributed over the interval (0∞) (i.e.,  ∈ (0∞))
(b) Individuals bear children due to their concern for old-age support.
Individuals allocate their wage income , between consumption, 
 and expenditure on
child rearing, 
. The individual’s budget constraint is therefore

 + 
 ≤  (4)
2.3 Optimization
Members of generation  choose the number of their children, and therefore their own con-
sumption, so as to maximize their utility function subject to their budget and the subsistence













 = (1 − 
) ≥ ˜ ;

 ≥ 0
As long as the potential wage income at time  is suﬃciently high so as to assure that
the optimal level of consumption exceeds the subsistence consumption constraint ˜  (i.e., as
long as  is above the level at which the subsistence constraint is binding) and as long as the
non-negative fertility constraint does not bind, it follows from the individual optimization that
the consumption of individual  in period  is 
 =[ ]
1 ≡ (;)
21In particular, the elasticity of substitution  between consumption and fertility equals  =( 1 )(1 +

1−
 ) For the elasticity of substitution to monotonically decrease with  i.e.   0 it is suﬃcient
to assume that exp and 0  ˜ (1 − ) . The latter condition as it will become evident guarantees that
the economy starts from a stage of development where the population is not vanishing that is fertility is at least
at replacement level. Note that using a utility function where the elasticity of substitution is unconditionally
inversely related to , that is adopting a homothetic utility function, similar to one of the cases considered in
the appendix, yields qualitatively similar predictions.
22For simplicity, it is assumed that the subsistence consumption constraint and the weight given to consumption
in the utility function are homogenous across individuals and hence they are not subjected to natural selection.
11Lemma 1 There exists a threshold level of income, ˜  =˜ () ≡ ()˜  such that the
subsistence consumption constraint binds for individual  if and only if   ˜ ().
˜ ˜ ()   




Proof. Since (;) is strictly monotonically increasing in  and since (0;)=0and
lim
→∞ (;)=∞ it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists a
unique level of income, ˜  such that (˜ ;) ≡
£
˜ 
¤1 =˜ . Hence, there exists ˜  =
()˜  ≡ ˜ () such that if   ˜ () then (;)  ˜  and the subsistence consumption
constraint binds, whereas if  ≥ ˜ () then (;) ≥ ˜  and the subsistence consumption
constraint does not bind. Moreover, since ˜ 1 and ()  1 it follows that ˜ () ≡
()˜   ˜  and ˜  =( )˜  ln˜ 0 ¤
Corollary 1 There exists a threshold level of elasticity of substitution, ˜ () ≡ ln()ln˜ 
such that the subsistence consumption constraint binds for individual  if and only if   ˜ ()
where
˜ () ≥ 0 if and only if  ≤ 





Proof. As established in Lemma 1, the subsistence consumption constraint binds for individual
 if and only if   ˜ ()=( )˜  Since ˜ () is strictly monotonically decreasing in  it is
invertible,  ≡ ln(˜ )ln˜  and the subsistence consumption constraint binds for individual
 if and only if   ˜ () ≡ ln

 ln˜ .S i n c e ln˜ 0,i tf o l l o w st h a t˜ () ≥ 0 if and only if
  1 (and thus ln  0) Moreover, ˜ () =( l n˜ )  0 ¤
Thus, at suﬃciently low levels of income individuals of all types are constrained by the
subsistence requirement. However, the subsistence consumption constraint stops binding at a
lower level of income for those individuals with a lower elasticity of substitution.
At follows from Lemma 1, as long as ˜  ≤  ≤ ˜ () the subsistence consumption con-
straint binds, the level of consumption of individual  is equal to the subsistence level, ˜  and
given the budget constraint (4), the level of fertility is [1 − (˜ )] Moreover, as follows
12from the optimization problem (5), if the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding,

 =[ ]
1 and therefore 
 =[ 1− 
]  023
The consumption of individual of type  as a function of the income level  is





˜  if ˜  ≤  ≤ ˜ ()
()
1 if  ≥ ˜ ()
(6)
where 
  0 for  ≥ ˜ ()
The number of children of individual of type  as a function of the income level  is





[1 − (˜ )] if ˜  ≤  ≤ ˜ ()
[1 − ()1
(1−)
 ] if  ≥ ˜ ()
(7)
The eﬀect of an increase in income,  on the individual’s allocation of resources between






Figure 1. The Income Expansion Path of Individual :
The Optimal Levels of Consumption and Fertility as a Function of Income
The income expansion path is vertical as long as the subsistence consumption constraint
is binding. As income increases, the individual can obtain the subsistence consumption with a
smaller fraction of income and the fraction of income devoted to child rearing increases. Once,
the level of income is suﬃciently high such that the subsistence constraint is not binding,
23The positivity follows from the fact that 

  .
13the income expansion path has a positive but ﬁnite slope, reﬂecting increasing allocation of
resources for both consumption and child rearing.
As depicted in Figure 2, for   ˜  the fertility rate of individual  in any period , 

is a positive, increasing, strictly concave function of  In particular, 









)  0 if ˜  ≤  ≤ ˜ ()
[( − 1)()1
(1−2)
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Figure 2. Fertility of Individual  as a Function of Income.
Moreover, as established in the following lemma, as long as the subsistence consumption
constraint binds, the fertility rate exceeds the replacement level if income per worker is not
smaller than ˜ (1 − )
Lemma 2 1. If the subsistence consumption constraint binds for individual  in period ,
(i.e., if  ≤ ˜ ()) then the individual’s fertility rate is above replacement if  ≥ ˜ (1−)
i.e.,

 = () ≥ 1  ˜ (1 − ) ≤  ≤ ˜ ().
2. Fertility is above replacement for all individuals if income per capita exceeds  i.e.,
()  1   ≥ 
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
142.4 Elasticity of Substitution and Reproductive Success
The eﬀect of the elasticity of substitution on fertility rate and thus on reproductive success, as
depicted in Figure 3, evolves non-monotonically in the process of development. In early stages
of development, when the level of income is low, lower elasticity of substitution has an adverse
eﬀect on fertility and reproductive success, whereas at higher levels of income, lower elasticity
of substitution has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on reproductive success. This non monotonic eﬀect of the
elasticity of substitution on fertility across diﬀerent levels of output per capita is the driving
force behind the changing distribution of the entrepreneurial spirit in the population along the
path of the economic development.
Proposition 1 The eﬀect of the elasticity of substitution on reproductive success evolves non-
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=0  ˜     and  ≤ ˜ () ≡ ln

 ln˜ 
 0  ˜     and   ˜ () ≡ ln

 ln˜ 
=0   = 
 0     








0  ˜    ˜ ()
()1 ln()
2
   ≥ ˜ ()
(9)
Hence: (a) Since {[˜    ˜ ()] i fa n do n l yi f[˜     ] and [  ˜ () ≡ ln()ln˜ ]}
it follows from (7) that 
 =0if [˜     and  ≤ ln

 ln˜ ]. (b) Since {[  ˜ ()]
i fa n do n l yi f[  ˜ () ≡ ln()ln˜ ]} it follows from (7) that 
  0 if [˜     
and   ln

 ln˜ ],n o t i n gt h a tln()  0 if and only if [   ]. (c) Since ln()=0
if and only if [ = ] it follows from (7) that 
 =0if  = (d) Since ln()  0
and if and only if [   ] it follows from (7) that 
  0 if     ¤
Hence, for low levels of income ˜      individuals with a high elasticity of
substitution have an evolutionary advantage, whereas for high levels of income     
individuals with a lower elasticity of substitution gain the evolutionary advantage.
At low levels of income, i.e., ˜  ≤     the subsistence consumption constraint
binds all individuals whose  ≤ ln()ln˜  The entire resources that remain after sub-
sistence consumption are devoted to fertility and elasticity of substitution therefore has no
eﬀect on fertility. However, those individuals with lower elasticity of substitution, whose
  ln()ln˜  are not constrained by the subsistence consumption constraint. They
15do not allocate the entire resources above subsistence to fertility. Hence, as long as    
the marginal eﬀect of higher  on fertility is negative 
At higher levels of income, i.e.,  ≥  the subsistence consumption constraint is not
binding for any individual regardless of the elasticity of substitution. It is at this stage of
development that child rearing, which is a time-intensive activity, is relatively more expen-
sive than own consumption, that is the relative prices of the goods under consideration, i.e.
own consumption versus child rearing, are in favor of consumption. Consequently, individ-
uals whose choices are more responsive to relative prices allocate a smaller fraction of their
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Figure 3. Elasticity of Substitution and Reproductive Success
 ∈ (1¯ )
3 The Process of Development
The process of development is governed by the time path of the level of technology, income per
capita and the composition of the traits that govern the elasticity of substitution.
3.1 The Evolution in the Composition of Types
Suppose that at time 0 the economy consists of 0 individuals of two types: type 1 and type
2, Individuals are distinguished by their elasticity of substitution. Individuals of type 1 have a
higher elasticity of substitution than individuals of type 2, i.e., 1  1  2  ¯  and  is the
fraction of those with high elasticity of substitution (type 1) in the population.
The two types of individuals supply inelastically one unit of labor, regardless of their
16elasticity of substitution, and generate therefore the same level of income. However, as estab-
lished in (6), (7) and Proposition 1, the elasticity of substitution aﬀects their consumption and
fertility decisions, and therefore their reproductive success.
In accordance with the historical pattern of fertility, income per worker is assumed to be
suﬃciently high in every period, so as to assure that fertility rates are at least at replacement
level in period 0 for individuals for which the subsistence consumption constraint binds. Hence
in light of Lemma 2, it is assumed that income per-capita in period 0 i ss e tt ob ee q u a lt o
˜ (1 − ) i.e., 0 =˜ (1 − )
As follows from Lemma 1 the subsistence consumption constraint stops binding earlier
for individuals of type 2 i.e., ˜ (2)  ˜ (1). As long as the subsistence consumption constraint
binds for both types, it follows from Proposition 1 that elasticity of substitution has no eﬀect
on fertility and the composition of types in the population does not change.
However, as income increases, the subsistence consumption constraint stops binding for
the low elasticity of substitution individuals (type 2) and ultimately for individuals of type 1,
and as established in Proposition 1, the forces of natural selection aﬀect the composition of
types and the economic environment.
Hence, without loss of generality, suppose that at time 0 the level of income is such that
the subsistence consumption constraint does not bind for individuals of type 2 w h i l ei ts t i l l
binds for individuals of type 1 Since 0 =˜ (1 − ) it follows that the subsistence constraint
does not bind for the low elasticity of substitution (type 2) individuals if ˜ (2)  ˜ (1 −
), whereas for those exhibiting high elasticity of substitution the subsistence consumption
constraint still binds if ˜ (1)  ˜ (1 − ).T h u s , 24
˜ ˜ (2)  ˜ (1 − )  ˜ (1) (A1)
Alternatively, since  ∈ (1¯ ), it is assumed that25
1  1  ˜ (˜ (1 − ))  2  ¯ 
where as deﬁned in Corollary 1 ˜ (˜ (1 − )) is ˜ () ≡ ln()ln˜  evaluated at  =
˜ (1 − )





 2()  ˜ (2) ≤    
= 2()  [ = ] or [˜    ˜ (2)]
 2()     
24It should be noted that since ˜ (2) ≡ ()˜ 
2 and since 2  ¯  ≡ 1+l n ( )ln˜  it is necessarily the
case that ˜ ˜ (2)
25˜ (1)  1 if and only if ˜   Hence, since ˜  ≥  and 1 it follows that ˜  and therefore ˜ (1)  1
17Proof. The corollary follows directly from (7) and Proposition 1, noting that since 2 
˜ (˜ (1 − )) ≡ 1+l n ( ((1 − )))ln˜  then 2  ln

 ln˜  for ˜ (2) ≤     ¤
Hence, as depicted in Figure 4, in early stages of development, when the subsistence
consumption constraint binds for some individuals, (i.e., ˜ (1 − ) ≤     ) the entre-
preneurial individuals, that is those characterized by high elasticity of substitution (type 1)
have an evolutionary advantage, whereas as soon as the economy escapes from the Malthusian
trap and the subsistence consumption constraints is no longer binding (i.e.,    ) the low
elasticity of substitution (type 2) have an evolutionary advantage.26
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Figure 4. Reversal in the Evolutionary Advantage in the Process of Development
˜ ˜ (2)  ˜ (1 − )  ˜ (1)





(1 − ) (10)
where  is the fraction of individuals with high elasticity of substitution (type 1) in the
population, and 
 is the number of oﬀspring born to individual of type  in period 
26Unlike Galor and Moav (2002) in which diﬀerences in preferences (i.e., attitude towards child quality)
generates diﬀerences in income and which results in diﬀerences in reproductive success, in the proposed theory the
evolutionary advantage is based upon diﬀerences in preferences (i.e., diﬀerences in the elasticity of substitution)
that do not aﬀect income, but nevertheless, generate variations in fertility and thus reproductive success.





 +( 1− )2

 (11)
Hence, it follows from (7) that
+1 = ( ) ≡
⎧
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   ˜ (1)
(12)
Lemma 3 The Properties of ( )
For  ≥ ˜ (2)
1 (0 )=0 and (1 )=1
2 ( )  0 and [( ) ≷ 0 iﬀ  ≷ ]
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
Hence, as depicted in Figure 5, for a given level of income per worker,  the fraction
of entrepreneurial individuals in the population, that is those exhibiting high elasticity of
substitution, increases monotonically over time and approaches 1 if ˜ (2) ≤  ≤ ˜ (1) whereas
this fraction declines monotonically over time and approaches 0 if    
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Figure 5. The Evolution of the Proportion of Individuals with
High Elasticity of Substitution,  for a given Income Level
3.2 Technological Progress
Technological progress, +1 that takes place between periods  and +1 depends on the fraction
of individuals with high elasticity of substitution and, thus entrepreneurial spirit, within the




= ( ) (13)
Hence, the rate of technological progress between period  and  +1is a (weakly) positive,
(weakly) increasing, concave function of the fraction of entrepreneurial individuals among the
working generation at time  and the level of income per-capita (that assures survival and
replacement fertility).28
27W h i l et h er o l eo ft h es c a l ee ﬀect in the Malthusian epoch, is essential, none of the existing results depend
on the presence or the absence of the scale eﬀect in the modern era. The functional form of technological
progress given in (13) can capture both the presence and the absence of the scale eﬀect in the modern era.
As discussed in the introduction there is extensive evidence on the role of entrepreneurial spirit in innovative
activities. The positive role of income per capita in technological progress is well established as well. In a
Malthusian environment, a higher level of income per capita will be associated with a larger population that
would have a positive eﬀe c to nt h es u p p l y ,t h ed e m a n da n dt h ed i ﬀusion of knowledge. Moreover, it will foster
specialization and trade and will therefore enhance technological progress (Kremer (1993) and Galor and Weil
(2000). In the industrial world higher income per capita will support a more educated population that is more
likely to implement new technologies (Schultz (1975), and will generate a wider tax base that would permit
extensive investment in infrastructure, education and research. This beneﬁcial impact of the output per worker
is assumed to dominate the adverse eﬀect of the latter on the elasticity of substitution.
28For a suﬃciently low income level and small fraction of entrepreneurial traits in the population the rate of
technological progress is strictly positive only every several periods. Furthermore, the number of periods that
20( ) ≥ 0 and ( ) ≤ 0 ∀ ∈ [01] and ∀  ˜ 
( ) ≥ 0 and ( ) ≤ 0 ∀ ∈ [01) and ∀  ˜ 
 ((A2))
The time path of the level of technology is given therefore by
+1 =( 1++1) (14)
where the level of technology at time 0 is given at a level 0
3.3 The Time Path of Income Per Worker
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Hence, it follows from (14) that the income per capita in period  +1is determined by
the level of income per capita in period   and the fraction of high elasticity of substitution,
entrepreneurial individuals in the adult population, 
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 ˜ (1) ≤ 
(18)
An increase the fraction of the traits with high elasticity of substitution individuals,
 has unambiguously positive eﬀects on the level of income per worker in period  +1 
+1 =( +1+1)
  in an environment where higher elasticity of substitution is conducive
pass between two episodes of technological improvement declines with an increase in both these factors. These
assumptions assure that in early stages of development the economy is in a Malthusian steady-state with zero
growth rate of output per capita, but ultimately the growth rates is positive and slow. If technological progress
would occur in every time period at a pace that increases with the above determinants, the growth rate of output
per capita would always be positive, despite the adjustment in the size of population.
21to individuals reproducing at lower rates, (i.e., when    ) It raises the level of technology
in period +1 and reduces the population size in the population next period. However, when
   and thus the high elasticity of substitution individuals reproduce at a higher rate, an
increase the fraction of these individuals (type 1)i np e r i o d has an ambiguous eﬀect on output
per-worker in +1s i n c ei th a sap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on both the level of technology and population
in period  +1 
An increase in output per capita,  has ambiguous eﬀects on the level of income per
worker in period +1 On the one hand it increases the level of technology in the next period,
+1 and thus positively aﬀecting output per worker, but on the other hand, it increases
fertility rates in period  and thus the size of the population in period +1 adversely aﬀecting
income per capita.
4 The Dynamical System
The evolution of the economy is fully determined by the evolution of a two-dimensional non-
linear discrete dynamical system that is governed by the sequence { }∞
=0 such that
+1 = ( )
+1 = ( )
(19)
where (0 0) is given.
The analysis of this two-dimensional dynamical system will require the derivation of its
phase diagram, based on the characterization of the  locus under which the ﬁrst state variable
is in a steady-state, the  locus under which the second state variable is in a steady-state,
and the forces that operate on the system when each of variables is not in its steady-state
equilibrium.
4.1 The  locus
The  locus is the geometric locus of all pairs ( ) such that  is in a steady state.
 ≡ {( ):+1 −  =0 }
As follows from (12), along the  locus
( ) −  =0  (20)





 0  ˜ (2) ≤    
=0  [ = ] or [˜    ˜ (2)] or [ ∈ {01}]
 0     
(21)
22Proof: As follows from (11)
+1 −  =
(1 − )[1() − 2()]
1()+( 1− )2()
(22)





 0  1()  2()  ˜ (2) ≤    
=0 
[1()=2()]
or [ ∈ {01}]

[ = ] or [˜    ˜ (2)]
or [ ∈ {01}]




As depicted in Figure 6, the fraction of high elasticity of substitution, entrepreneurial
individuals,  is in a steady state if:
()  =0 i.e., there are only individuals of type 2 in the population and thus there
are only individuals of type 2 in all future periods.
()  =1 i.e., there are only individuals of type 1 in the population and thus there
are only individuals of type 1 in all future periods.
()[  = ] or [˜    ˜ (2)], i.e., the two types reproduce at the same rate and thus
there are no changes in the composition of the population over time.
4.2 The Replacement Locus - yy
The replacement frontier  , as depicted in Figure 6, is the geometric locus of all pairs ( )
such that the average level of fertility is at replacement level, i.e.,
 ≡ {( ):1()+( 1− )2()=1 } (24)
Lemma 5 The properties of the replacement locus- yy
1. There exists a continuous single-valued function, () such that given (()) the
average fertility level is at replacement, i.e.,
(()) ∈  ∀ ∈ [01] 
2. The level of income that corresponds to replacement fertility, () is monotonically




  0 ∀ ∈ [01] 
23where
(1) = ˜ (1 − )
()    ∀ ∈ [01]

3. The average level of fertility is below replacement if and only if   
 () and above
replacement if and only if   () i.e., ∀ ∈ [01]
1()+( 1− )2()  1    
 ()
1()+( 1− )2()  1    
 ()

Proof. See Appendix ¤
The replacement locus, depicted in Figure 6, is downward sloping.29 As established
in Corollary 2, as the fraction of the high elasticity of substitution individuals,  increases,
fertility is higher (for a given level of income below ), and thus the level of income that is
needed to support replacement fertility, () is lower.
Corollary 3 Along the replacement locus, fertility of the high elasticity of substitution individ-
uals (type 1) is above replacement and fertility of those with low elasticity of substitution (type
2) is below replacement, i.e.,
2(())  1  1(()) ∀ ∈ (01)
Proof. As follows from Lemma 5, 1(
 )+( 1− )2(
 )=1  Hence since ˜ (1 − ) 
()   it follows from Corollary 2 that 1(
 )  2(
 ) and thus 2(())  1 
1(()) ¤
4.3 The  locus
The  locus is the geometric locus of all pairs ( ) such that  is in a steady state.
 ≡ {( ):+1 −  =0 }
As follows from (16) and (18), along the  locus
( ) −  =0  (25)
and therefore
+1 −  = 
∙µ






29Without loss of generality, Figure 6 is drawn under the assumption that the 
 l o c u si sc o n v e x . N o t e ,
however that as long as the locus is downward sloping the qualitative analysis remains intact.
24Hence,
+1 −  R 0 ⇔ 1+( ) R [1()+( 1− )2()] (27)
In order to simplify the exposition and to assure that the economy may escape from the
Malthusian trap, few boundary conditions are imposed on the function ( )
( )  1() − 2()   ∈ [˜  ˘ ] i fa n do n l yi f  ∈ [0 ˘ ];
( )  
1()
 +( 1− )
2()











where ˘  ∈ (01) and ˘  = (˘ ) ∈ (())
Lemma 6 The properties of the  locus.
Under (A2) and (A3)
1. There exists a continuous single-valued function, () such that
(()) ∈  ∀ ∈ [01]
2. There exists a decreasing continuous, single-valued function () ∈ (()) such
that
(()) ∈  and 0()  0 ∀ ∈ [0 ˆ )






 0  ()    () and  ∈ [0 ˆ )
 0 
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
The  locus and its corresponding map is depicted in Figure 6. The  l o c u sc o n s i s t so f
two downward sloping segments: (i) the replacement locus  and (ii) a single value function
() that intersects the  locus at ˆ  and the  locus at (0(0))
254.4 Steady-State Equilibria
Steady-state equilibria of the dynamical system are pairs (¯ ¯ ) such that
¯  = (¯ ¯ )
¯  = (¯ ¯ )

Hence a steady-state equilibrium is characterized by an intersection of the  locus and the 
locus. As depicted in Figure 6, the system is characterized by three steady-state equilibria.
Lemma 7 The dynamical system has three steady-state equilibria
(¯ ¯ )={(0(0))(0(0))(1(1))}




( )=( 0 (0)) if and only if 0 =0
Proof. The lemma follows from the properties of the  locus and the  l o c u sa se s t a b l i s h e d
in Lemmas 4 and 6, and as depicted in Figure 6. ¤
Corollary 4 If the initial fraction of the high elasticity of substitution, entrepreneurial, indi-
viduals is greater than zero, i.e., if 0  0 then in the long-run the fraction of entrepreneurial




( )=( 0 ∞) if 0  0














Figure 6. The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Spirit
and the Process of Development
4.5 The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Spirit and the Process of Development
Suppose that the economy starts with an income per-capita that is just suﬃcient to generate
replacement fertility, (0) That is, the economy starts on the  locus. Suppose further
that there is a small fraction of high elasticity of substitution, entrepreneurial individuals in
27the economy, 0  ˆ . As depicted in Figure 6, the forces of natural selection will increase
the representation of these growth promoting individual in society, and once this fraction will
exceed the critical level ˆ  income will increase monotonically along with the fraction of the
entrepreneurial traits. Once the level of income per-capita increases above the threshold level
of income  the subsistence consumption constraint is no longer binding for all types and the
evolutionary advantage is reversed. Individuals characterized by low elasticity of substitution
generate an evolutionary advantage and  starts declining approaching asymptotically 0 Along
this process income per-capita increases monotonically.
It should be noted that in the absence of the forces of natural selection the economy
will remain indeﬁnitely in a Malthusian equilibrium. That is, if elasticity of substitution, is
not hereditary and the distribution of types remains unchanged over time, the level of income
per capita will remain at a level (0) where consumption is at the subsistence level and
fertility is at replacement. This will constitute a stable Malthusian equilibrium. Technological
advancement will be counterbalanced by an increase in population growth, whereas adverse
technological shocks will be oﬀset by population decline.
5R o b u s t n e s s
5.1 Elasticity of Substitution is Distributed over the Entire Feasible Range
This section demonstrates that the evolutionary pattern of the elasticity of substitution in
the process of development, as established in Proposition 1, remains intact if elasticity of
substitution is distributed over the entire feasible range (i.e., if (01) ∪
¡¯ ∞
¢





has been already analyzed.






Proof: As established in Lemma (1), ˜ () ≡ ()˜  Hence, the subsistence consumption
constraint binds if ˜ () ≥ ˜  i.e., if ()˜  ≥ ˜  and therefore if
 ≤ 1+l n ( )ln˜  ≡ ¯ 
¤
Lemma 9 There exists a threshold level of income ˆ () ≡ ()1(1−) such that the non-
negative fertility constraint binds above ˆ () if and only if   (01)and below ˆ () if and
28only if  
¡¯ ∞
¢
,i . e . ,

 =0if   ˆ () and  (01)    ˆ () and  
¡¯ ∞
¢
Proof. As follows from (4) and the strong monotonicity of the utility function, 
 ≥ 0 if and
only if 
 =[ ]
1 ≤  and therefore, if and only if  ≤  or ()
1 ≤ . Hence,

 ≥ 0 i fa n do n l yi f ( − 1)ln ≥ ln() (28)
Hence,

 ≥ 0 iﬀ
©
 ≤ ˆ () and   (01) or  ≥ ˆ () and   ¯ 
ª
(29)






 ≥ ˆ () and   (01) or  ≤ ˆ () and   ¯ 
ª
(30)
and the lemma follows. ¤
Hence, it follows from lemmas 8 and 9, noting that ˜ () ≤ ˆ () if  ∈ (01), that the






 ˜  ≤  ≤ ˜ () and (01)

 =[ 1− (˜ )]
⎧
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˜ () ≤  ≤ ˆ () and (01)

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 ≥ ˆ () and (01);











≤ 0 if   ˜ ()   ∈ (01)
≥ 0 otherwise

Hence, the enlargement of the feasible range  does not aﬀect the qualitative pattern of
the evolution of the elasticity of substitution as established in Proposition 1.
The introduction of the individuals with very high elasticity of substitution in the popula-
tion, i.e., individuals with  ∈ (01) does not aﬀect the reversal in the evolutionary advantage.
29As follows from Lemma 1, the highly responsive to relative prices individuals in the population,
i.e., individuals with  ∈ (01) are constrained by the subsistence consumption constraint for
a wider income range, and thus their evolutionary advantage is accentuated over a wider range
of low levels of income. However, as follows in Proposition (1) once  exceeds the threshold
value of  they lose the evolutionary advantage to those who are less responsive to relative
prices since elasticity of substitution now negatively aﬀects fertility (for the entire feasible range
of ).




does not aﬀect the qualitative results either. As follows from Lemma 9, at low levels
of income (i.e., if  ≤ ˆ ()) they would become extinct, and at a moderate levels of income,
(i.e., ˆ () ≤    ) as follows from Proposition (1), they would produce consistently fewer
children. However, for    they would gain the evolutionary advantage.
5.2 The Old Age Security Hypothesis
This section demonstrates that the evolutionary pattern of the elasticity of substitution in
the process of development, as established in Proposition 1, remains intact if the incentive of
individuals to have children is enhanced by the material support that children may provide to
their parents in old age — The Old Age Security Hypothesis.
Suppose that individuals within each generation live for three period. In the ﬁrst period
of life (childhood), individuals consume a fraction of their parental income, . In the second
period of life (parenthood), individuals are endowed with 1 unit of time. They work and
generate an an income  which they allocate between consumption, 
, child rearing, 

and transfers to their parents . In the third period (old age), individuals consume the aggregate
output transferred to them by their children, 
.
Preferences of individuals  are represented by a separable utility function with (hetero-













Members of generation  choose the number of their children, and therefore their own
consumption in periods  and  +1 , so as to maximize the utility function (31) subject to the
following constraints.
30A direct utility from children along with the old-age security would not aﬀect the qualitative results. Ad-
ditionally, it will become apparent, from this robustness check, that if individuals had common risk aversion,
 over both consumption and children (with or without a direct concern for old age consumption), that is if
preferences were homothetic, then all the results presented would remain intact. In particular, in this case the










































¢− − [(1 − 
) − ]− ≡ 0 (34)
As established in the following Lemma, the eﬀect of the elasticity of substitution on
reproductive success evolves non-monotonically in the process of development, as was the case
in the absence of old age consumption motive for having children.
Proposition 2 The eﬀect of the elasticity of substitution on reproductive success evolves non-























































 0      




The reversal stems from the eﬀect of the level of income on the relative cost of third period
consumption relative to second period consumption. Old age consumption is secured via the
production of children. In early stages of development, income is low, the cost of children is low
and thus the cost of third period consumption relative to second period consumption is low.
31For the simplicity of the exposition, ˜  =0for both periods.
31Hence, individuals with high elasticity of substit u t i o nw h o s ec h o i c e sa r em o r er e s p o n s i v et ot h e
relative prices, optimally allocate more resources towards the (cheaper) old-age consumption
and thus to child rearing, and the representation of their type increases in the population over
time. As the economy develops and income increases, the cost of raising children and thus old
age consumption gets eventually higher than the cost of second period consumption. In this
stage, however, individuals with high elasticity of substitution, who are more responsive in their
choices to relative prices, optimally allocate more resources towards second period consumption
and less toward children. Hence, the less entrepreneurial individuals i.e. those with relatively
low elasticity of substitution, allocate relatively more resources towards fertility and gain the
evolutionary advantage.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This research suggests that a Darwinian evolution of entrepreneurial spirit played a signiﬁcant
role in the process of economic development and the evolution of inequality within and across
societies.
The study argues that traits for entrepreneurial spirit evolved non-monotonically in the
course of human history. In early stages of development, the rise in income generated an
evolutionary advantage to entrepreneurial, growth promoting traits and their increased rep-
resentation accelerated the pace of technological advancements and the process of economic
development. Natural selection therefore had magniﬁed growth promoting activities in rel-
atively wealthier economies as well as within the upper segments of societies, enlarging the
income gap within as well as across societies. In mature stages of development, however, non-
entrepreneurial individuals gained an evolutionary advantage diminishing the growth potential
of advanced economies. Hence, the forces of natural selection contributed to the convergence
of the intermediate level economies to the advanced ones, as well as to the convergence of
entrepreneurs among the middle class to the landed aristocracy.
The research identiﬁes a novel force that operates towards a convergence of intermediate
level economies to the richer ones. Unlike the commonly underlined forces of economic con-
vergence (i.e., higher returns in laggard economies to investments in human capital, physical
capital and technological adoptions), the research suggests that convergence is triggered by the
higher prevalence of individuals with entrepreneurial traits in the middle income economies.
The prediction of the theory regarding the evolution of inequality and entrepreneurial
activities within a society is consistent with the pattern observed in England during the course
of the Industrial Revolution. In particular the theory suggests that the failure of the landed
aristocracy to lead the innovative process of industrialization could be attributed to the low
32representation of entrepreneurial individuals within this group, and the prevalence of individuals
with entrepreneurial traits among the middle and even the lowers class. The rise in inequality
that characterized the early stages of the Industrial Revolution was therefore reversed and
inequality started to decline.
The analysis is deliberately conducted in a framework that abstracts from the heterogene-
ity of individuals in the production process. This simplifying modeling assumption prevents
the introduction of an additional source of heterogeneity across individuals – income. To the
extent that growth-promoting individuals manifest their entrepreneurial propensity by creating
and taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities, they would generate on average higher income,
and thus in an era in which larger income is converted into larger number of surviving oﬀspring,
their evolutionary advantage would be accentuated. Moreover, if the proposed theory would
be embedded in the context of a uniﬁed growth theory (Galor, 2005) in which economies evolve
endogenously from a Malthusian stagnation to sustained economic growth, in advanced stages
of economic development, higher income would not have a positive eﬀect on fertility (Galor and
Weil, 2000),32 the selection of entrepreneurial traits that is underlined by the proposed theory
would not be aﬀected, although it would be obscured by a more elaborate structure.
32See also, Lagerlöf (2003), Doepke (2004), and Weisdorf (2004) as well.
337A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .
1. As follows from (4), as long as the subsistence consumption constraint binds, 
 =[ 1−
(˜ )] ≥ 1 i fa n do n l yi f ≥ ˜ (1 − ) where ˜ (1 − )  1
2. As follows from (7) and (8) ()  1 for all  ≥  if ()  1 and therefore if
[1 − ()]  1 which is satisﬁed since 1 −  and 1 ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .







 +( 1− )2
]2  0 (37)













 0  ˜ (2)     
≥ 0   ≥ 
 (38)
¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 .
1. As follows from (24) there exists a function Ω(
 ) such that
Ω(
 )=1(
 )+( 1− )2(















Thus, noting (40), it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem, that there exists a continuous
single-valued function, () such that
(()) ∈  ∀ ∈ [01]  (41)
2. As follows from (24)
()

























34Lemma 2 and Corollary (2) imply that
1()=2()  1 (43)
and thus it follows that the average level of fertility will be at replacement level only if
()    ∀ ∈ [01] (44)
Hence, it follows from Corollary (2) that 1(
 ) − 2(
 )  0 and therefore, in light of (40),
it follows from (42), that
()

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯

 0 ∀ ∈ [01] (45)
Finally, noting (39), (1) i sg i v e nb yt h es o l u t i o nt o1(
 )=1 and therefore it follows
from (7) that
(1) = ˜ (1 − )  1  (46)
since ˜ (1 − )
3. Noting (8) fertility is positively aﬀected by output per worker, and thus it follows from (24)
that for any  ∈ [01]
1(
 )+( 1− )2(
 ) S 1 ∀ S 
 () (47)
¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .
1. As established in (27), +1 −  =0i fa n do n l yi f
1+( )=[ 1()+( 1− )2()] (48)
Hence since [1(
 )+( 1− )2(
 )] = 1 and (
 )=0it follows that (()) ∈
 ∀ ∈ [01]
2. As established in (25), +1 −  =0 if and only if ( ) −  =0  As follows from (27),


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
+1−=0
=
{[1() − 2()] − ( )}
{( ) − [
1()
 +( 1− )
2()
 ]}
Hence, it follows from (A3) that along the  locus, that denominator does not vanish, and
there exists a decreasing continuous, single-valued function () ∈ (()) such that
(()) ∈ 
35where ∀ ∈ [0 ˆ )


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
+1−=0
 0.
Moreover, as follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem,n o t i n g( A 3 ) ,→ˆ ()=(ˆ ),
(0) ∈ (˘ ),a n dˆ  ∈ [˘ 1)
3. As established in Lemma 2, 1()+( 1− )2()  1    
 (). Hence since
( )=0for all  ≤ 
  it follows that
+1 −   0  ˜   ≤ 

As follows form Assumption (A3), +1 −   0 if and only if ()    () and
 ∈ [0 ˆ ) ¤
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